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LET THE JUDGE SPEAK: RECONSIDERING 
THE ROLE OF REHABILITATION IN 
FEDERAL SENTENCING 
MADELINE W. GORALSKI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a judge in a criminal case.  The trial is 
over, and the defendant, Jamie, was convicted of a serious  
drug-related crime, her second conviction for similar crimes.  
Previously, she served the United States Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) maximum sentence of eighteen months.  
Today is her sentencing proceeding for the most recent 
conviction.  You feel very strongly that imprisonment is the 
proper punishment for Jamie in this case.  However, you are 
unsure as to how long the term of imprisonment should be.  
Suppose the maximum sentence for this crime, according to the 
Guidelines, is twenty-four months.  You believe that two years is 
a sufficient punishment due to the severity of the crime and the 
fact that it will keep Jamie from committing similar crimes 
during her incarceration.  The twenty-four-month sentence might 
even send a message to others in society that these drug crimes 
can lead to long periods of imprisonment, and you hope that the 
sentence will deter others from following in Jamie’s footsteps.  
However, Jamie’s past conduct has shown that she poses a high 
risk of recidivism.  At a nearby prison facility, there is a highly 
regarded rehabilitation program that helps defendants overcome 
drug problems and gives them vocational training so that they 
can get jobs when they are released from prison.  The problem for 
Jamie, and for you, is that this program requires thirty-two 
months to complete and the United States Supreme Court, in 
Tapia v. United States,1 interpreted § 3582(a) of the Sentencing 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. 
John’s University School of Law. 
1 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
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Reform Act to mean that promoting rehabilitation cannot be a 
factor justifying an increase in the length of a criminal 
defendant’s term of imprisonment.2  Therefore, even if you 
believe that her rehabilitative needs should be factored into 
Jamie’s sentence, you cannot say anything about those needs at 
the proceeding for fear of offending Tapia. 
Judges today are faced with this problem on a regular basis.  
Many defendants would benefit from the rehabilitative programs 
offered in prisons, but because of the prohibitive language in 
§ 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act,3 defendants like Jamie 
are released from prisons without undergoing any type of 
rehabilitation and then fall back into their criminal ways. 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) was passed 
during an ideological shift towards conservatism within the 
government and in the wake of several studies that suggested 
the rehabilitative system used in prisons during the majority of 
the twentieth century was flawed because it did not achieve its 
goal of reducing the risk of recidivism among defendants.4  
Section 3582 deals with sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment.5  It states that rehabilitation cannot be considered 
when imposing such a sentence and instead allows judges to 
consider only the other goals of punishment—deterrence, 
incapacitation, and retribution—when choosing to send a 
defendant to prison.6 
In 2011, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a split of 
authority among the circuit courts concerning the interpretation 
of § 3582(a) when it decided Tapia v. United States.7  There, the 
Court ruled that a violation of the statute occurs if a judge 
lengthens a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment solely to 
promote the defendant’s rehabilitation.8  Though this decision 
resolved the original split, it led to another concerning whether 
or not Tapia permitted a small degree of consideration of  
 
2 Id. at 2392. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). 
4 Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1033–34 
(1991). See generally Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers 
About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974). 
5 18 U.S.C. § 3582. 
6 Id. § 3582(a). 
7 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
8 Id. at 2392. 
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rehabilitation or if § 3582(a) and Tapia together constituted a 
complete ban on rehabilitation factoring into the decision as to 
the length of a defendant’s prison sentence. 
A look back at the reasons why rehabilitation was 
abandoned as an important consideration in sentencing a 
defendant to prison reveals several glaring flaws in the rationale 
for the move.9  Recent studies and opinions indicate that there 
are significant benefits to rehabilitation in prisons for the 
defendant as an individual and for society as a whole.10  Thus, it 
might be time to revisit the language of § 3582(a) and let 
rehabilitation play at least a minimal role in sentencing a 
defendant to prison. 
This Note contends that the importance of rehabilitation as a 
valid and necessary principle of punishment is overlooked in 
§ 3582(a) of the SRA and further argues that a judge should be 
permitted to consider rehabilitation when deciding to sentence a 
defendant to a term of imprisonment, so long as rehabilitation is 
not a dominant factor in coming to that decision.  Part I outlines 
the principles of punishment and the rise and decline of the 
rehabilitative system of punishment in the United States.  It also 
discusses the importance of rehabilitation and how society could 
benefit from a system that does not leave rehabilitation by the 
wayside.  Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tapia 
v. United States11 and the resulting circuit split concerning the 
degree to which rehabilitation can be considered when 
sentencing a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment in 
accordance with § 3553(a)(2)(D) and § 3582(a) of the SRA.  
Finally, Part III recommends that the Supreme Court resolve the 
circuit split by adopting the Fifth Circuit’s additional justification 
and dominant factor tests, or alternatively, that Congress amend 
§ 3582(a) so as to permit judges to consider and talk about 
potential rehabilitation, without fear of being overruled for such 
discussions, when sentencing a defendant to prison. 
9 Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032–34; Michael Welch, Rehabilitation: Holding its 
Ground in Corrections, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (1995). 
10 Id. 
11 131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
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I. PUNISHMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
A. Principles of Punishment 
When a person is charged and convicted of a crime under the 
laws of the United States, a judge then sentences that person to a 
punishment so that the defendant is forced to suffer a 
consequence for that defendant’s actions.12  The Sentencing 
Reform Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) permits a person found 
guilty of a punishable offense to be sentenced to (1) a term of 
probation, (2) a fine, or (3) a term of imprisonment.13  One or 
more of the four common justifications for these punishments—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—can 
rationalize the consequences an individual has to endure as a 
result of committing a crime.14 
Retribution is the idea that “punishment is justified when it 
is deserved.”15  A retributivist looks backward in time and 
decides if a person deserves punishment based on the 
wrongdoer’s past choices.16  For retributivists, the focus is on the 
past and the belief that a criminal should be punished whether or 
not the punishment will result in a later reduction of crime.17  
The principle behind retributivism is that a wrongdoer, or 
defendant convicted of a crime, should be punished because they 
used their free choice to act in a certain way, and in doing so, 
violated the rules of society.18 
To the contrary, a person who sees punishment from a 
utilitarian perspective looks to the future at what effects the 
punishment will have on society and on the defendant.19  A 
utilitarian believes in the idea of the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people; therefore, the pain stemming from 
punishment can be justified if and only if it results in a reduction 
12 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.02(A) (6th ed. 2012). 
13 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012). All of these forms of punishment are subject to the 
provisions of § 3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) and to various other 
subchapters in the SRA. See generally id. §§ 3551–3586. 
14 Andrea Avila, Note, Consideration of Rehabilitative Factors for Sentencing in 
Federal Courts: Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), 92 NEB. L. REV. 404, 
406 (2013). 
15 DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(B)(1). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. § 2.03(A)(1). 
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of future crime and pain.20  The four utilitarian justifications for 
punishment are general deterrence, individual deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.21 
Deterrence is the first utilitarian justification for 
punishment.  The idea behind both general and individual 
deterrence is to stop individuals who might have the inclination 
to commit a crime in the future from doing so because they are 
aware of the punishments that criminals who committed  similar 
crimes were subjected to.22  General deterrence is meant to 
convince the general community or society to refrain from future 
criminal conduct and individual deterrence serves the same 
purpose for those who have already committed a crime.23  The 
punishments should be severe enough so as to intimidate 
defendants and make it so they do not want to endure those 
punishments a second time.24  Critics of deterrence as a 
justification for punishment cite the high rates of recidivism in 
the United States25 as evidence that deterrence has served no 
purpose in reducing crime.26  However, proponents argue that 
there is no way to know what crime rates would be without 
punishment, and therefore, there is no statistically accurate way 
to determine if punishment is serving as a deterrent to crime.27 
Incapacitation, the second utilitarian justification for 
punishment, is tied to specific deterrence in that it focuses on the 
individual who committed the crime and how that person’s 
incarceration can benefit society.28  The justification behind 
incapacitation is that while the defendant is being punished, the 
defendant is prevented from committing more crimes because of 
isolation from society during the period of punishment.29  The 
theory of incapacitation is criticized because it is a very limited 
20 Id. 
21 Id. § 2.03(A)(2). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 “For example, of a selection of persons released from prison in 1994, an 
estimated 67.5% were re-arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three 
years, 46.9% were reconvicted, and 25.4% were resentenced to prison for a new 
crime.” Avila, supra note 14, at 407 n.27. 
26 Id. at 407. 
27 Id. 
28 DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2). 
29 Id. This justification for punishment specifically applies to punishment in the 
form of imprisonment. Id. 
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solution to the problem of criminal conduct within society; future 
criminal conduct is difficult to predict and most prisoners will be 
released eventually.30 
Rehabilitation, the final justification for punishment, focuses 
on the individual defendant but also results in benefits for society 
as a whole.  The effectiveness of rehabilitation has been debated 
a great deal during the latter half of the twentieth century and 
continues to be a topic of much discussion today.31  The goal of 
rehabilitation is similar to that of the other utilitarian principles 
of punishment: to reduce future crime.32  The idea behind 
rehabilitation stems from the assumption that people who 
commit crimes are suffering from a sickness that can be cured 
with the proper treatment.33  Such treatment can come in the 
form of mental or psychiatric care, educational or vocational 
training, or drug and alcohol treatment programs.34  Advocates of 
rehabilitation as a consideration in punishment believe that it is 
a more favorable form of punishment than one based on scaring 
the defendant into behaving in accordance with societal norms.35  
Proponents are quick to point out that the idea of redemption, 
which is at the heart of rehabilitation, reflects the  
Judeo-Christian values that the United States was founded 
upon.36  However, rehabilitation has numerous critics who point 
to studies that suggest the rehabilitation efforts used in prisons 
for a great deal of the twentieth century did little to reduce 
recidivism.37 
B. History of the Rehabilitative System 
Throughout the history of the United States, there have been 
many theories of punishment and methods for bringing those 
theories into practice.  The rise and decline of the rehabilitative 
system of punishment are the hallmarks of the twentieth century 
in regards to sentencing and the prison system.38  The early 
30 Avila, supra note 14, at 407. 
31 Id. at 407–09. 
32 DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2). 
33 Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1012. 
34 DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2). 
35 Id. § 2.04(A)(2). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Shanna L. Brown, Comment, Sentencing and Punishment—Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Sentencing Reform Act Precludes Courts from Lengthening a Prison 
FINAL_GORALSKI 6/28/2016  2:48 PM 
2015] LET THE JUDGE SPEAK 1289 
1900s saw the establishment of the federal parole system, 
authorizing the use of indeterminate sentencing in which the 
judge, Congress, and a parole board each played a role in 
determining the length of a defendant’s sentence.39  This model 
developed over time into the “medical model” of the 1950s.40  
Under the medical model, rehabilitation as a principle of 
punishment focused around the idea that criminality, or the 
tendency to commit crimes, is a disease that can be treated 
through programs run as part of the prison system.41  When 
defendants were sentenced under this system they were 
classified in a state “diagnostic center” and placed into a 
treatment program designed to reduce their risk of recidivism 
upon release from prison.42  The Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”) provided specialized programs for inmates that focused 
on a variety of areas, ranging from drug and alcohol treatment to 
educational and behavioral adjustment programs.43 
Despite lasting for over two decades as the dominant 
justification for imprisonment as a form of criminal punishment, 
influential studies conducted and published in the 1970s cast 
some doubt on the effectiveness of rehabilitation in prisons, 
suggesting that the rehabilitative ideal—every criminal can be 
cured—might not be an achievable goal.44  The critics of 
rehabilitation argued that rehabilitation simply did not work 
because it was philosophically unsound and led to greater 
inequality.45  There was evidence that because the rehabilitative 
model required completion of the treatment programs to be 
considered effective, some prisoners were serving significantly 
longer sentences than others found guilty of the same crime.46  
Some studies claimed that since the rehabilitative model had  
 
 
Sentence Solely To Foster Offender Rehabilitation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 375, 382–84 
(2011). 
39 Id. at 382. 
40 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 382–83. 
44 See e.g., Martinson, supra note 4 at 23–25 (discussing the results of one of the 
most famous studies conducted during that time period). Martinson’s article was 
later known as the “nothing works” article. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032. 
45 Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032. 
46 Id. at 1025. 
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taken full effect the prison population had doubled, a clear 
indication that the goal of reduction in crime was not being 
achieved.47 
At the same time that the flaws in the rehabilitative system 
were beginning to show, the United States government started 
making an effort to demonstrate its power in the aftermath of the 
unstable social movements during the 1960s.48  As a result, the 
government took a “tough on crime” stance, leaning away from 
the liberal rehabilitation model and, in effect, making those who 
still supported the model seem like soft on crime bleeding 
hearts.49  There was a concern, even among judges themselves, 
that the indeterminate and rehabilitative system of sentencing 
left judges and parole boards with almost unchecked power when 
it came to sentencing and imprisoning criminal defendants.50  
This broad discretion led to a discrepancy in sentences that 
seemed to be at odds with the idea of equality, one of the most 
important and fundamental goals in the American system of 
government.51  These fears, accompanied by the ideological shift 
from soft-hearted liberalism to hard-fisted conservatism, led to 
an acceptance of a retributive model of punishment that 
culminated in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.52 
C. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Rehabilitation 
The problems with federal sentencing and the rehabilitative 
model were brought to the attention of Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy by Judge Marvin E. Frankel53 of the Southern District 
47 Id. at 1030–31. 
48 Welch, supra note 9. 
49 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) Some liberals even joined the 
conservative movement, citing the just deserts, or retributivist, model as the ideal 
form of punishment for someone who committed an act that is considered inherently 
wrong. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1024. 
50 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228 
(1993). 
51 Id. at 227. 
52 Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1015; Welch, supra note 9; Brown, supra note 38, at 
386. 
53 Judge Frankel, a former Columbia law professor and fifteen-year member of 
the federal bench in the Southern District of New York, advocated for sentencing 
reform because he found the sentencing powers he possessed as a judge to be “almost 
wholly unchecked and sweeping” and “terrifying and intolerable for a society that 
professes devotion to the rule of law.” Stith & Koh, supra note 50 (quoting MARVIN 
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of New York and by members of a Yale University sentencing 
seminar.54  Both Judge Frankel and the members of the Yale 
seminar voiced their heavy criticism of the current sentencing 
system and made recommendations to Senator Kennedy.55  In 
response, Senator Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 2966, a 
sentencing reform bill, in 1975.56  This first bill was criticized 
because it did not clearly define the goals of sentencing, and 
therefore, it did not pass.57  The following years saw several 
different bills calling for the restructuring of criminal sentencing, 
but each attempt failed to pass both houses.58  After nine years of 
debate, the House and the Senate finally passed the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, which imposed a determinate sentencing 
system focused on the four principles of punishment.59  In the 
Senate Report that accompanied the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (“SRA”), Congress indicated that it believed the 
indeterminate sentencing model had failed, calling the pre-1984 
model “ ‘coercive’ rehabilitation” and stating, “We know too little 
about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a 
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a 
particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.”60 
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission 
(“Commission”) which acts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 99461 and is 
part of the judicial branch of the federal government.62  The 
E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
54  Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85. “Each month, members of this seminar 
would meet and discuss the problems with the current sentencing scheme and make 
recommendations for reform. The monthly sessions culminated in a book, which 
included a detailed proposal for the creation of sentencing guidelines and the 
creation of an independent sentencing commission.” Id. at 384 (footnote omitted). 
55 Stith & Koh, supra note 50, at 228–30; Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85. 
56 Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85. 
57 Id. at 385. 
58 Id. at 385–86. For example, Senate Bill 1437, introduced again by Senator 
Kennedy along with Senator John McClellan, placed a clear prohibition on 
considering rehabilitation when imposing a term of imprisonment, but the bill did 
not pass because it lacked a discussion of the four primary philosophies behind 
punishment in the criminal system. In contrast, House Bill 6915 permitted the 
consideration of rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing but said it could not be a 
primary factor in deciding whether or not to incarcerate the defendant. Id. 
59 See id. 
60 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983). 
61 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012). 
62 Brown, supra note 38, at 387. The United States Supreme Court validated the 
authority of the Sentencing Commission in 1989: 
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Commission helped create a determinate sentencing model to 
combat the pervasive sentencing disparity that was at issue 
under the indeterminate rehabilitative model.63  The Commission 
was charged with creating the United States Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) which set out the appropriate  
kind—probation, fine, or term of imprisonment—and range of 
punishment for each category of criminal offense.64 
When the Guidelines were first promulgated, there was 
debate about whether they should be considered mandatory.65  In 
United States v. Booker,66 the Court held that making the 
Guidelines mandatory would violate the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to a jury trial.67  This ruling stripped the SRA of its 
mandatory nature but kept the majority of the statute intact, 
ruling that the Guidelines were advisory for sentencing judges.68  
Under Booker, sentencing judges are permitted to deviate from 
the range set forth in the Guidelines if there are particular 
mitigating factors, but judges must explain their reasons for 
deviating from the Guidelines recommendation.69 
Despite the advisory nature of the Guidelines, there is still 
robust debate in federal courts concerning the interpretation of 
certain sections of the SRA.  Two such sections are § 3553(a)(2) 
and § 3582(a), both of which deal with the principles of 
punishment.70  The debate concerns the seemingly conflicting 
language in those sections regarding the permissibility of a judge 
considering rehabilitation when contemplating imposing a prison  
 
 
The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit Congress from 
delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the 
intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such 
significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system of 
checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the 
accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating 
policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges. 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
63 See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1028. 
64 28 U.S.C. § 994; Brown, supra note 38, at 387. 
65 See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
66 Id. at 226. 
67 Id.. 
68 Id. at 245. 
69 Id.; Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1027. 
70 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3582(a) (2012). 
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sentence and what the length of that sentence should be.71  
Section 3553(a)(2) lays out the goals of punishment in the federal 
system: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed[] to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner . . . .72 
In effect, § 3553(a)(2) calls for sentencing judges to consider 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation when 
sentencing defendants.73  Dispute has arisen, however, when 
judges and lawyers compare § 3553(a)(2)(D), permitting 
rehabilitation as a factor to be considered during sentencing, 
with § 3582(a), dealing with imposing a term of imprisonment. 
Section 3582(a) provides, “The court, in determining 
whether . . . a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in 
determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set 
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, 
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”74 
In grappling with how these two seemingly contradictory 
sections work together, it is first necessary to examine what the 
legislature intended when it dealt with the issue of 
rehabilitation, a system it was trying to leave behind, when 
passing the SRA.  The Senate Report was clear that the “caution 
concerning the use of rehabilitation as a factor to be considered 
in imposing [a] sentence is to discourage the employment of a 
term of imprisonment on the sole ground that a prison has a 
program that might be of benefit to the prisoner.”75  This 
statement indicates that Congress was wary of the rehabilitative 
model of punishment but did not direct that it should be 
abandoned altogether.76  For example, § 3582(a) only applies to a 
71 Id. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
73 Id. 
74 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
75 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983). 
76 Brown, supra note 38, at 386. 
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sentence for a term of imprisonment, not to the other available 
types of punishment; therefore rehabilitation can be considered 
when determining the defendant’s overall sentence.77  
Additionally, the Senate Report was clear that judges could still 
consider the availability of rehabilitation programs when 
considering which facility to recommend a defendant be sent to.78  
When it comes to rehabilitation and its role in sentencing a 
defendant to a term of imprisonment, a reading of the Senate 
Report demonstrates that, under the SRA, rehabilitation cannot 
be the sole factor considered when sentencing a defendant to a 
term of imprisonment.79  However, courts around the country 
disagree as to whether the move away from the rehabilitative 
model was effective.80  This led to a debate about whether the ban 
on considering rehabilitation under § 3582(a) also applies when a 
judge determines the length of the term of imprisonment.81 
D. Flaws with the Rationale of the 1970s—Why Rehabilitation 
Works 
The rationale behind the movement away from rehabilitation 
as a goal of punishment in prisons was flawed in several ways.  
The initial impetus for the antirehabilitation movement stemmed 
from an article written by Robert Martinson entitled “What 
Works,” which quickly became known as the “nothing works” 
article.82  Martinson believed that rehabilitation in prisons had 
no identifiable effects on the rate of recidivism among former 
inmates.83  However, after his original work gained a great 
degree of fame and was cited during the numerous discussions 
advocating for a move away from rehabilitation, Martinson wrote 
a second article essentially denouncing his findings from the 
“nothing works” article as inherently flawed.84  Using a new 
research method, Martinson was able to determine to what 
77 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76–77. 
78 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119. 
79 Id. at 76–77, 119; Brown, supra note 38, at 386. 
80 See infra Part III. 
81 See Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011). 
82 See generally Martinson, supra note 4. See also Vitiello, supra note 4, at 
1032–33. 
83 Martinson, supra note 4, at 25; see Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032–33. 
84 Vitiello, supra note 4. at 1033–34. See generally Robert Martinson, New 
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 243 (1979). 
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degree certain combinations of treatment, coupled with other 
conditions, would produce a less likely chance that a defendant 
would commit a crime a second time.85 
In addition to the flawed research techniques used in the 
“nothing works” article, the circumstances of the time period and 
the resources available in the prisons may have led to inaccurate 
conclusions about the effectiveness of rehabilitation in prisons.86  
Proponents of rehabilitation attribute the ineffectiveness of such 
programs during the middle and latter part of the twentieth 
century to staff problems and the lack of funds available to 
federal prisons to implement the necessary programs.87  The staff 
and funding limitations placed on prisons made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the rehabilitation programs, which were meant to 
reduce rates of recidivism, to be executed to their fullest extent.88  
Therefore, the problem in the 1970s was not that rehabilitation 
in prisons was not working; it was that the system was not 
equipped with the proper resources to allow these programs to 
reach their full potential. 
One of the main arguments against rehabilitation as an 
effective form of punishment stems from the idea that 
rehabilitation entails forcing an offender to become prosocial.89  
In response to these arguments, proponents of rehabilitation as a 
form of punishment argue that “[a]lthough reformation may not 
be possible in all circumstances, . . . it will often work if society is 
prepared to commit the necessary resources to the process.”90  
The proper resources and dedication to the rehabilitative process, 
advocates contend, would fix the problems that led to the demise 
of the rehabilitative system in the first place.91  In addition, there 
is a valid argument for rehabilitation in the idea that the initial 
85 Martinson, supra note 84, at 244; Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1033. 
86 Welch, supra note 9, at 4. 
87 Id. at 5–6. 
88 Id. at 4, 6. 
89 Id. at 3–4. Conservatives are skeptical about the idea that individuals’ 
tendencies to turn to criminal conduct stems from the social conditions in which they 
were placed. This also leads to a concern about the effectiveness of the treatment 
received during a term of imprisonment. Some argue that while defendants may 
leave prison after completing rehabilitative programs as people less likely to commit  
crimes, when they return to their old lives, that progress will be washed away 
because defendants will find themselves back in the same circumstances that led 
them to commit crimes in the first place. Id. 
90 DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.04(A)(2). 
91 Id. 
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high costs of implementing effective rehabilitation programs 
would create future savings.92  By putting forward the money for 
prison programs aimed at rehabilitating defendants now, society 
would save money on court costs and the cost associated with any 
potential future imprisonment of a recidivist defendant. 
Rehabilitation is also important because it is the only 
principle of punishment that considers the defendant’s needs and 
welfare rather than just the needs and preservation of society.93  
Incapacitation, deterrence, and retributivism all look at the effect 
of the defendant’s crime and punishment on society, while 
rehabilitation looks to help the defendant overcome whatever it 
was that caused the defendant to be inclined to commit a crime 
in the first place.  In the prison system, as opposed to the system 
of punishment considered by Congress and the courts when 
determining the laws and reasons behind sentencing, 
rehabilitation is seen as a valid goal.94  The consideration of 
defendants’ needs lends a sense of humanity to the correctional 
system that does not exist when the sole reason for sentencing 
defendants to imprisonment is to lock them away for a 
predetermined period of time.95 
These arguments all support the idea that the importance of 
rehabilitation when sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment should be reconsidered.  Tenth Circuit Judge 
Harris Hartz shared this idea.  In his concurrence to United 
States v. Story,96 Judge Hartz argued that rehabilitation should 
play at least some role in sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment.97  He discussed the mandate of § 3553(a)(2)(C) in 
conjunction with his argument, which directed courts to consider 
the need to protect the public from any future crimes the 
defendant might commit as a factor when imposing a sentence on 
a defendant.98  The idea behind the incapacitation considered 
92 Id. 
93 Welch, supra note 9, at 6. 
94 Id. at 6–7. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). In this case, the defendant was sentenced to 
twenty-four months in prison in order to make her eligible for a residential drug 
abuse program, and the court prohibited a lengthening of her sentence for this 
purpose. Id. at 1243, 1245. 
97 Id. at 1249 (Hartz, J., concurring). 
98 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012); Story, 635 F.3d at 1249. 
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here, he posited, is directly tied to the concept of rehabilitation.99  
“Although rehabilitation is not a proper ground for increasing a 
sentence, the threat of recidivism is.  And whether one views the 
problem as a need for rehabilitation or a need to protect against 
recidivism may well depend only on the lens one is looking 
through.”100  Therefore, an increased length in prison sentence for 
rehabilitative purposes not only furthers the goal of 
incapacitation, but also reduces the risk of recidivism, which 
Judge Hartz views as a valid sentencing goal.101 
The importance of rehabilitation expressed by Judge Hartz is 
not lost on other federal judges.  In cases like those discussed in 
Part II,102 many appeals stem from sentencing judges speaking 
about rehabilitation during the proceeding, presumably because 
they believe it is an important and relevant justification for 
punishment.  However, because of the restrictive language in 
§ 3582(a) of the SRA, judges are forced to frame their discussion 
of rehabilitation as recommendations to the BOP rather than 
risk being overturned because they verbally considered the 
benefits that rehabilitation might have on the defendant and 
society during the sentencing proceeding.103 
II. TAPIA AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Like the scholars during the later half of the twentieth 
century, courts around the country disagree as to the importance 
of rehabilitation when sentencing a criminal defendant to a term 
of imprisonment.  As discussed supra, in Tapia v. United 
States,104 the Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing judge can 
neither impose imprisonment nor lengthen a term of 
imprisonment to promote the defendant’s rehabilitation.105  The 
issue Tapia was intended to resolve arose as a result of the 
seemingly conflicting uses of rehabilitation in § 3582(a) and 
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) and judges’ desire to discuss rehabilitation 
despite the apparent prohibition of its consideration in 
§ 3582(a).106  Some circuit courts held that § 3582(a) barred 
99 Story, 635 F.3d at 1249. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See infra Part II. 
103 See infra Part III. 
104 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
105 Id. at 2393. 
106 Avila, supra note 14, at 413; Brown, supra note 38, at 388. 
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courts from considering rehabilitation at all when imposing any 
sentence that involved imprisonment,107 while others held that 
rehabilitation can be a factor in considering the length of a 
sentence; it just cannot be a factor when deciding to sentence a 
defendant to imprisonment.108  In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 
on Tapia v. United States in an attempt to resolve this circuit 
split and end the conflicting holdings about rehabilitation’s role 
in federal sentencing.109 
A. The Supreme Court’s Current Ruling on Rehabilitation and 
Sentencing—Tapia 
Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling unauthorized 
aliens into the United States in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).110  At her sentencing, the 
district court imposed a fifty-one-month term of imprisonment to 
be followed by three years of postrelease supervision, the 
maximum of the forty-one to fifty-one-month recommended 
prison sentence as set forth in the United States Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines111 (“Guidelines”).  In issuing this sentence 
the district court judge spoke about why he was imposing the 
maximum sentence:  “[O]ne of the factors that affects this 
[sentence] is the need to provide treatment.  In other words, so 
she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program,” 
officially known as the Bureau of Prisons Residential Drug Abuse 
Program.112  On appeal, Tapia argued that her sentence was in 
violation of § 3582(a), which states that “imprisonment is not an 
appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”113  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the circuit split 
and determine whether, despite the language concerning  
 
107 The holding in Tapia is most analogous to the holdings in the following cases: 
In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 849–51 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Manzella, 
475 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 597 (11th 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 946–47 (2d Cir. 1992). 
108 The following cases were overruled by the holding in Tapia: United States v. 
Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629–30 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 
557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994). 
109 Avila, supra note 14, at 413; Brown, supra note 38, at 388–89. 
110 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385. 
111 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385. 
112 Id. 
113 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). 
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rehabilitation in § 3553(a)(2)(D), a sentencing court judge can use 
rehabilitative hopes for the defendant as a reason to lengthen the 
term of imprisonment under § 3582(a).114 
To determine if the district court’s sentence length was 
impermissible, the Supreme Court conducted an analysis of what 
§ 3582(a) was meant to achieve and reviewed the record for 
inconsistencies within that analysis.115  The Court ultimately 
held in favor of the defendant, stating, “Section 3582(a) precludes 
sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to 
promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”116  Because the sentencing 
transcript, on its face, showed that the district court judge 
lengthened Tapia’s sentence based solely on her rehabilitative 
needs,117 the judgment was reversed and remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to consider other 
issues.118 
In its reasoning, the Court noted that § 3553(a)(2) dictates 
the four purposes of sentencing as retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation but pointed out that each of 
these apply to sentencing differently, or not at all, depending on 
the type of sentence being imposed.119  The language of § 3582(a) 
instructs judges to consider the factors from § 3553(a)(2), but 
explicitly rejects the promotion of rehabilitation as a factor to be 
considered when imposing a sentence of imprisonment.120  In 
addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), the United States Sentencing 
Commission is charged with the duty of “insur[ing] that the 
guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to 
a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the 
defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment.”121  Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, said that 
the analysis of the issue could end there because the clarity of 
the statutes indicates that courts should refer to all of the 
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(D), 3582(a) (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386. 
115 See generally Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382. 
116 Id. at 2391. 
117 Id. at 2392. 
118 Id. at 2393. 
119 Id. at 2387–88; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Section 3551(b) of the SRA 
allows judges sentencing a federal offender to impose sanctions in the form of 
imprisonment, probation, or fine. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012). 
120 18 U.S.C §§ 3553(a)(2), 3582(a) (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388. 
121 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2012). 
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justifications for punishment, except for rehabilitation, when 
determining whether to impose imprisonment and, if they chose 
to do so, how long the term of imprisonment should be.122 
However, the Court went on to address the argument 
presented in the opposing amicus brief which said that the word 
“recognize,” as it appears in § 3582(a), simply means that a judge 
should “not put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to 
rehabilitate,” and that rehabilitation can still be considered, to at 
least some degree, when determining length of imprisonment, if 
not when deciding to impose a sentence of imprisonment in the 
first place.123  This argument was quickly struck down when the 
Court reiterated the clarity of the language in § 3582(a) and 
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) and noted that the word “imprisonment” itself 
does not distinguish between the “defendant’s initial placement 
behind bars and his continued stay there.”124  The Court noted 
that when imposing a term of probation or supervised release, 
judges are statutorily entrusted with the power to order a 
defendant to participate in a rehabilitation program, but there is 
no provision that gives the courts this power during the period of 
the defendant’s incarceration.125  The silence of the statute in this 
area is cited as evidence of Congress’s intent to deny judges the 
capacity to order defendants to participate in prison-run 
rehabilitation programs.126 
The holding of this case—a judge may not lengthen a 
criminal defendant’s sentence of imprisonment based on the need 
for rehabilitation127—is clear, but the Court did allow one caveat 
to its ruling, saying that a sentencing court does not commit 
error by simply discussing opportunities for rehabilitation 
available during the length of a defendant’s imprisonment.128  
The Court noted that § 3582(a) permits a judge to “make a 
recommendation concerning the type of prison facility 
appropriate for the defendant”129 and, in that manner, may  
 
 
122 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388. 
123 Id. at 2388–89. 
124 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389–90. 
125 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2392. 
128 Id. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
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encourage the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to place a 
particular defendant in a place with access to treatment that 
might help the defendant.130 
B. The Post-Tapia Circuit Split 
While, as discussed above, Tapia attempted to resolve a prior 
circuit split, the Supreme Court’s decision led to continued 
disagreement between several circuit courts concerning the level 
of consideration the goal of rehabilitation can play in 
determining the length of a term of imprisonment before it 
becomes Tapia error.  Some circuits agree that as long as 
rehabilitation is not a “dominant” factor, but merely an 
“additional justification” in determining the length of the 
sentence of imprisonment, consideration of rehabilitative goals is 
permissible, even to increase the length of a defendant’s 
sentence.131  Conversely, other circuits interpreted Tapia in a 
more literal fashion, holding that rehabilitation cannot be 
considered when sentencing a defendant to prison and can only 
be discussed so as to recommend a prison facility to the BOP.132 
1. “Additional Justification” and “Dominant” Factor Tests 
On one side of the rehabilitation circuit split are the Tenth, 
Eighth, and Fifth circuit courts that believe rehabilitation can, 
and even should, play a minor role in determining the length of a 
defendant’s imprisonment.133  These courts seem to agree with 
the Senate Report, that rehabilitation should not be the sole 
purpose in sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment, 
but that rehabilitation is nonetheless an important principle of 
punishment that should not be ignored as a justification for 
sending a criminal defendant to prison.134 
In United States v. Cardenas-Mireles,135 the Tenth Circuit 
held that it was permissible for judges to consider rehabilitation 
when determining the length of a prison sentence, so long as 
130 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
131 United States v. Receskey, 699 F.3d. 807, 812 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United 
States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cardenas-
Mireles, 446 F. App’x 991, 995 (10th Cir. 2011). 
132 United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 767–68 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 2012). 
133 See cases cited supra note 131. 
134 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983). 
135 446 F. App’x 991. 
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rehabilitation was only an “additional justification” as to the 
length of the sentence.136  Defendant Cardenas-Mireles was 
charged with illegal reentry into the United States from Mexico 
after having been deported four times as a result of his forty-four 
convictions and seventy-two additional arrests over a period of 
three decades.137  The district court judge sentenced him to the 
maximum sentence recommended by the Guidelines, ninety-six 
months.138  On appeal, Cardenas-Mireles argued that his lengthy 
sentence was based on his need for rehabilitation, specifically 
medical care, and such a basis was a violation of Tapia and 
§ 3582(a).139  In explaining its reasoning for the lengthy sentence, 
the district court emphasized the defendant’s recidivist 
tendencies, as evidenced by his numerous arrests and 
convictions.140  The judge believed that Cardenas-Mireles’s 
incapacitation was in society’s best interest.  The defense 
centered its arguments on the sentencing judge’s following 
statement:  “I just cannot bring myself to agree that any 
downward departure is particularly relevant here, especially 
given [Cardenas-Mireles’s] mental and physical condition.”141  
However, in explaining its holding, the Tenth Circuit determined 
that the defendant’s “health was, at best, an additional 
justification, but not a necessary justification, for the 96-month 
sentence.”142  This “additional justification” test adheres to 
Tapia’s holding because the district court would have imposed 
the ninety-six-month sentence regardless of Cardenas-Mireles’s 
need for medical rehabilitation due to his need to be 
incapacitated.143  The discussion of his need for such treatment is 
permissible under the caveat in Tapia through which a 
sentencing judge is permitted to discuss and make 
recommendations concerning a defendant’s need for 
rehabilitation.144 
136 Id. at 995 (emphasis omitted). 
137 Id. at 992. 
138 Id. at 992–93. 
139 Id. at 994. 
140 Id. at 995. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011). 
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The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United 
States v. Pickar.145  In this case, the court held that as long as 
rehabilitation was not a “dominant” factor in imposing a 
particular sentence length, then its consideration did not result 
in error on behalf of the sentencing court.146  The defendant, 
Gregg Allen Pickar, was sentenced to a 150-month imprisonment 
after being found guilty of bank robbery by a jury.147  Although 
the Guidelines recommended a sentence range of 100 to 125 
months, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence based on 
Pickar’s recidivist tendencies, the danger he posed to the public, 
and the need to deter other people in society from committing the 
same crimes as Pickar.148  The sentencing judge noted that being 
on probation in the past had not dissuaded Pickar from 
continuing his criminal tendencies and “that a long sentence is 
necessary to provide Mr. Pickar with needed care and 
treatment.”149  The Eighth Circuit examined the factors listed in 
§ 3553(a), intended to guide a sentencing judge, and determined 
that the danger of Pickar’s recidivism and the need to deter the 
general public from committing similar crimes were the 
“dominant” factors in choosing to impose such a lengthy 
sentence.150  Because the sentence passed the “dominant” factor 
test, meaning that the need for rehabilitation was not a 
“dominant” factor, and in fact, there was no indication 
whatsoever that Pickar’s sentence was lengthened on 
rehabilitative grounds, the 150-month sentence was affirmed.151 
By adopting both the “additional justification” test and the 
“dominant” factor test, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. 
Receskey,152 affirmed the defendant, Julie Ann Receskey’s, 
sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment upon revocation of her 
supervised release stemming from a guilty plea to possession 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine.153  Receskey argued 
145 666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 2012). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1167–68. 
148 Id. at 1168–69. 
149 Id. at 1169. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1169–70 (contrasting the case at hand to Tapia where the trial court 
explicitly lengthened the defendant’s sentence in order to ensure that she would be 
able to complete a drug treatment program). 
152 699 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2012). 
153 Id. at 808. 
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that this sentence was unreasonable due to the fact that the 
district court violated Tapia by considering her need for 
rehabilitation when determining her sentence.154  While the 
sentencing judge did discuss Receskey’s need for drug treatment 
and expressed a hope that she would receive assistance in that 
area from the BOP, a simple discussion of the opportunities that 
the defendant would have in prison to pursue rehabilitation is 
not Tapia error.155  The Fifth Circuit ruled that, based on the 
district court’s discussion, it was clear that the judge was merely 
expressing a hope that Receskey would participate in some type 
of rehabilitative program.156  The sentencing judge’s concern over 
Receskey’s needs may have been an “additional justification” in 
imposing the sentence, but any such justification was outweighed 
by the “dominant” factor of specific deterrence; the defendant had 
violated her supervised release on numerous occasions by testing 
positive for drug use and needed to be deterred from committing 
further violations.157  To succeed on her appeal, Receskey would 
have had to prove that rehabilitation was a “dominant” factor in 
the judge’s decision to send her to prison and that it was more 
than a simple “additional justification.”158  This is a seemingly 
high standard that indicates the Fifth Circuit’s inclination to 
allow more discussion of rehabilitation than a strict 
interpretation of § 3582(a) and Tapia suggest. 
2. Rehabilitation: A Nonfactor 
Where the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits permitted 
courts to consider rehabilitation as a factor in determining the 
length of a defendant’s terms of imprisonment,159 the Second and 
Sixth Circuits adopted a far stricter interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Tapia and § 3582(a).160  These circuits 
interpreted Tapia to mean that the only factors from § 3553(a)(2) 
that should be considered when sentencing a defendant to a term  
 
 
154 Id. at 809. 
155 Id. at 810. 
156 Id. at 812. 
157 Id. at 808, 812. 
158 Id. at 812. 
159 See generally 699 F.3d 807; United States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Cardenas-Mireles, 446 F. App’x 991 (10th Cir. 2011). 
160 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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of imprisonment are retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, 
constituting a complete ban on rehabilitation as a justification for 
imprisonment.161 
In United States v. Gilliard,162 the Second Circuit, addressing 
the defendant’s claims of a Tapia violation, affirmed the ninety-
six-month sentence, holding that the district court applied the 
permissible sentencing factors from § 3553(a) and correctly 
omitted any consideration of rehabilitation in determining the 
length of the sentence.163  The district court imposed an above-
Guidelines sentence of ninety-six months of imprisonment on 
Gilliard, who pleaded guilty to “conspiring to distribute and 
possess with the intent to distribute heroin.”164  The court based 
its decision on Gilliard’s “extensive criminal history,” which 
included prior convictions for drug related crimes, and his 
tendency to violate the terms of his supervised release.165  The 
court specifically stated that it sought to impose a lengthy 
sentence to advance the goal of specific deterrence due to 
Gilliard’s tendency for recidivism.166  While the district court did 
discuss Gilliard’s apparent drug problem and need for treatment, 
the judge only discussed rehabilitation by way of recommending 
treatment programs to the BOP, rather than considering such 
treatment in determining the length of the sentence; therefore 
there was no Tapia error.167 
The Sixth Circuit held similarly in United States v. Deen168 
when it found that the district court impermissibly considered 
rehabilitation as a factor in determining the length of Deen’s 
imprisonment, in violation of both Tapia and § 3582(a).169  Deen 
pleaded guilty to several violations of his supervised release—a 
punishment that was part of his sentence for a conviction for 
distributing cocaine—including domestic violence and alcohol 
use.170  The Guidelines recommend a four to ten-month prison 
sentence for such violations; however, the district court imposed 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 2012). 
162 671 F.3d 255. 
163 Id. at 257–59. 
164 Id. at 256–57. 
165 Id. at 257. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 259. 
168 706 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013). 
169 Id. at 767–68. 
170 Id. at 762. 
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a sentence of twenty-four months to “give the Bureau of Prisons 
another chance to do some in-depth rehabilitation with Mr. 
Deen.”171  The sentencing judge further stated, “[I]t is important 
to consider whether the goal of rehabilitation, which I think is 
the end game in terms of the criminal justice system, can be best 
achieved through incarceration, and it sounds as though maybe it 
can.”172  The Sixth Circuit, in overturning Deen’s sentence as 
clear Tapia error, reiterated that imprisonment is not a means 
by which the goal of rehabilitation should be pursued.173 
III. RECONSIDERING REHABILITATION IN PRISONS 
There is a large amount of controversy and associated case 
law that primarily stems from the original circuit split174 that led 
to the ruling in Tapia and the current circuit split.175  The 
continuing debate in this area concerning rehabilitation and its 
role as a form of punishment when dealing with a sentence of 
imprisonment serves as an indicator that the complete 
abandonment of the rehabilitative system from the early and 
mid-1900s may not have been the best course of action.  As 
detailed above, the importance of rehabilitation and the 
effectiveness of rehabilitative programs were severely 
misrepresented during the 1970s when the beginnings of the 
retributivist movement began.176  Armed with that knowledge, it 
may well be time to revisit and reevaluate the use of 
rehabilitation as part of a criminal defendant’s sentence of 
imprisonment. 
171 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
172 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
173 Id. at 767–68. On another appeal concerning the consideration of 
rehabilitation in sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[b]ecause it is 
impermissible to consider rehabilitation, a court errs by relying on or considering 
rehabilitation in any way when sentencing a defendant to prison.” United States v. 
Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014). The court recognized, as laid out 
in Tapia, that rehabilitation can be discussed in a limited manner during 
sentencing, but made it clear that anything that could be interpreted as 
consideration of rehabilitation constitutes plain Tapia error. This holding is 
different from that of the Second and Sixth Circuits because the court found Tapia 
error in the judge’s consideration of Vandergrift’s rehabilitative needs, but did not 
overrule the sentence because the error did not affect his “substantial rights” and 
the “sentence would have been different but for the court’s consideration of 
rehabilitation.” Id. at 1311–12. 
174 See cases cited supra notes 107–08. 
175 See supra Part II.B. 
176 See supra Part I.D. 
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A. Adopting the Fifth Circuit Test 
To resolve the current circuit split and to further the valid 
goal of rehabilitation, the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth 
Circuit’s combination of the “additional justification” and 
“dominant” factor tests.177  As mentioned above, the Senate 
intended § 3582(a) to prohibit rehabilitation from being the sole 
principle of punishment considered when sentencing a defendant 
to a term of imprisonment.178  This new test would allow judges 
to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs without the risk of 
judges relying on rehabilitation as the only reason behind 
sentencing a defendant to prison.  The test used by the Fifth 
Circuit does not offend the ruling in Tapia because it does not 
allow for a sentence to be lengthened for purposes of 
rehabilitation only;179 it does allow judges to discuss and consider 
rehabilitation as a secondary factor in the reasoning behind 
choosing to sentence the defendant to a particular term of 
imprisonment as a form of punishment, as opposed to imposing a 
fine or a term of probation.180 
The Second and Sixth Circuits adhered to Supreme Court 
precedent; however, they failed to consider the importance of 
rehabilitation to the defendant as an individual and to the 
betterment of society as a whole.181  Not permitting a sentence of 
imprisonment to be based on rehabilitation at all may increase 
the risk of recidivism for some defendants.182  Because of the 
unfortunate circumstances which many criminal defendants 
come from and return to upon their release from prison, the 
benefits of the deterrence and incapacitation these individuals 
were subjected to during their term of imprisonment can be 
washed away without the additional benefits of rehabilitation to 
177 See United States v. Receskey, 699 F.3d 807, 812 (5th Cir. 2012). 
178 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983). 
179 See Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011). 
180 Receskey, 699 F.3d at 812. 
181 United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 767–68 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit recognized that there is 
a growing trend back towards understanding and embracing rehabilitation in 
prisons as a benefit to both defendants and society; however, the court felt bound by 
the Supreme Court precedent from Tapia, and therefore, prohibited the district 
court from considering rehabilitation in any manner when determining the length of 
Deen’s term of imprisonment. Deen, 706 F.3d at 768–69. 
182 Welch, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
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help reduce the risk of recidivism.183  Allowing judges to consider 
and talk about rehabilitation freely as an “additional 
justification” when sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment, but only allowing deterrence, incapacitation, and 
retributivism to be the “dominant” factors in determining the 
length that sentence, would help to reduce this risk of recidivism, 
and therefore help both the defendant and society. 
B. Allowing Judges To Speak About Rehabilitation: Amending 
§ 3582(a) 
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court is unwilling to adopt the 
Fifth Circuit test, it may be the case that a more drastic measure 
is needed to balance the importance of rehabilitation and the 
statutory language in § 3582(a).  Therefore, Congress should 
adopt the Eighth Circuit’s “dominant” factor language into the 
statute.  With that small change the relevant language would 
read: “recognizing that imprisonment [may not be a dominant 
factor in] promoting correction and rehabilitation.”184  This would 
allow judges openly to pursue the valid goal of rehabilitation, as 
referenced in § 3553(a)(2)(D), without offending Congress’s 
original intention that rehabilitation not be the sole factor 
considered when sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment.185 
The purpose of the contested language of § 3582(a) is valid 
and should be maintained.  In limiting the use of rehabilitation 
when imposing a term of imprisonment, Congress wanted to 
“focus attention on the specific purposes of the sentencing process 
and assure that adequate emphasis is given to each.”186  Congress 
believed that a greater emphasis should be given to the goals of 
deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution in an effort to elevate 
the importance of the protection of society from criminal activity, 
but that does not mean that Congress intended to exclude 
rehabilitation from being given any consideration whatsoever.187  
This change to the statute would not offend Congress’s original 
183 Id. (acknowledging that rehabilitation is not a cure-all and that not all 
defendants can or will be rehabilitated, but noting that there is enough 
rehabilitative success to warrant a change in the system). 
184 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). 
185 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983). 
186 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119. 
187 See id. 
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intention because the “dominant” factor language inherently 
implies that rehabilitation is prohibited from being the sole 
justification for sentencing a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment, allowing deterrence, incapacitation, and 
retribution to have more substantial weight in the sentencing 
decision.188 
In all of the district court cases discussed above, the judges 
were talking about rehabilitation, and whether or not their 
respective sentences were overturned depended on the circuit 
courts’ interpretations of how much that discussion weighed in 
determining the length of the term of imprisonment.189  Tapia 
allows judges to discuss rehabilitation so long as they are 
recommending a particular facility to the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (“BOP”) in which an individual defendant will have 
access to the specific treatment that defendant may need, but the 
time needed to complete these programs may be longer than the 
time the defendant is sentenced to be in prison.190  Not being able 
to complete a rehabilitative program will not allow the 
defendant, upon release back into society, to take advantage of 
the full benefits rehabilitative programs have to offer, whether 
they be drug treatment, medical treatment, or even educational 
and vocational programs. 
This problem concerning balancing the need for 
rehabilitation against the other principles of punishment could 
be resolved if the wording of § 3582(a) were modified so as to 
permit some degree of consideration to rehabilitation when a 
defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  While this 
would create a fairly large change to the plain meaning of the 
statute, it is better to allow judges to speak freely concerning the 
defendant’s rehabilitative needs than for judges to keep quiet for 
fear of being overturned and perhaps silently allowing too much 
consideration to be given to rehabilitation, leading to an increase 
in prison populations and a depletion of rehabilitation resources.  
This change would permit rehabilitation to be used when 
necessary to help a defendant who is going to be sent to prison 
anyway and would maintain the prohibition against sending 
defendants to prison solely so that they are forced to enroll and 
complete a rehabilitative program. 
188 Id. 
189 See supra Part II.B. 
190 See generally Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
In promoting rehabilitative goals, not only would individual 
defendants benefit from the help and training they might receive 
while in prison, but society would benefit as well.  Allowing 
defendants more time to complete rehabilitative programs while 
in prison would lead to less recidivism upon release, resulting in 
a safer society.  Adopting the Fifth Circuit test or, alternatively, 
amending the language of § 3582(a), would allow you, as a judge, 
to sentence the defendant, Jamie, to thirty-two months in prison 
in the hope that she would be able to complete the drug 
treatment program and would be less inclined to commit more 
drug crimes in the future, assuming that your primary 
considerations for that sentence were incapacitation and 
deterrence.  Both solutions elevate the role of rehabilitation when 
sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment without 
offending Congress’s intention to prohibit rehabilitation from 
being the sole justification for sending a defendant to prison.  
This would promote the valid goals of rehabilitation, espoused by 
Congress when writing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and 
maintain the importance of the other principles of punishment by 
helping to reduce the risk of recidivism among defendants who 
are released back into society. 
